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Summary: The smooth functioning of the EU internal market entails 
not only regulatory harmonisation, but also a set of rules which, re-
gardless of the national laws of Member States, uniformly regulates 
company law and corporate governance at the supranational level. 
Availability, transparency and disclosure of information in listed com-
panies are of the utmost importance for company law and corporate 
governance, including capital market law. In company law and corpo-
rate governance, they are used as an instrument for the protection of 
shareholders and to control the activities of management and super-
visory boards, while in capital market law their purpose is to ensure 
reliable and accurate information for the whole capital market.
1. Introduction
The smooth functioning of the EU internal market entails not only 
regulatory harmonisation, but also a set of rules which, regardless of the 
national laws of Member States, uniformly regulates company law and 
corporate governance at the supranational level. Availability, transpa-
rency and disclosure of information in listed companies are of the utmost 
importance for company law and corporate governance, including capital 
market law. In company law and corporate governance, they are used as 
an instrument for the protection of shareholders and to control the acti-
vities of management and supervisory boards, whereas in capital market 
law their purpose is to ensure reliable and accurate information for the 
whole capital market.1
A comparative analysis of company law and corporate governance in 
the EU Member States2 reveals a number of differences in national laws 
and the need for uniform company law and corporate governance to the 
∗  Law Department, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb.
∗∗  Jean Monnet Chair, Department of European Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Rijeka.
1  G Ferrarini, L Enriques and M Gatti, ‘EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capi-
tal Markets Law: Do they Tackle Insiders’ Opportunism?’ (2006) Social Science Research 
Network 13 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=886345> accessed 20 April 2009.
2  M Adenas and H Wooldridge, European Comparative Company Law (CUP 2009).
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greatest extent possible. Differences arise from the affiliation of national 
laws either with the Anglo-Saxon or continental legal system. However, 
the natural evolution of national systems is not the only cause. Differen-
ces have also ensued from external factors, such as the modelling of laws 
or codes on those previously adopted in another state. 
Applying the comply-or-explain principle poses certain questions 
and difficulties in view of the differentiated approach in Member States.3
Following numerous corporate scandals in the United States and 
Europe, a need arose for efficient regulation of corporate governance in 
general and regulation of the activities of members of company bodies in 
particular, ie corporate behaviour. Apart from the existence of mandatory 
provisions which extensively regulate the operation of bodies in listed 
companies, the situation in the United States4 and Great Britain, as well 
as in other EU Member States, necessitated the creation and adoption of 
various ‘soft-law’ instruments,5 such as corporate governance codes, es-
pecially in the 1990s. In 1992, the first code which set the foundation of 
good corporate governance practice was introduced in Great Britain, un-
der the title the Cadbury Code. It established a novel regulatory concept 
known as ‘comply or explain’, or an obligation to declare compliance with 
a code of corporate governance.6 The Cadbury Code served as a regula-
tory model and was imitated in more than fifty states.7 
The corporate governance framework for listed companies in the 
European Union is a combination of legislation and soft law including 
recommendations and corporate governance codes. While corporate go-
vernance codes are adopted at the national level, Directive 2006/46/EC8 
3  For more on this issue, see H Horak and K Dumančić, ‘Usklađivanje u području prava 
društava RH s pravnom stečevinom EU’ (2011) Pravo i porezi 5.
4  The comply-or-explain approach in Great Britain differs from that in the US, ie the 
approach adopted in the Sarbanese Oxley Act in the US. Instead of the system in force in 
Great Britain, this is legislative regulation. 
5  ‘Soft law’ is a system of adopting rules regulating social relations outside the traditional 
method of adoption of legal rules by democratically elected legislative state bodies, whose 
application is enforced by criminal proceedings and litigations in court (hard law). Soft law 
is the system of autonomous private regulation by private law parties. For more on soft law, 
see N Bodiroga-Vukobrat and H Horak, ‘Kodeksi korporativnog upravljanja: instrument 
socijalno odgovornog gospodarenja’ in N Bodiroga-Vukobrat and S Barić (eds), Socijalno 
odgovorno gospodarenje (TIM press 2008) 201.
6  Subsequently amended on several occasions: in 2003 under the Combined Code and 
from 2010 the UK Corporate Governance Code. For more, see <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
all_codes.php> accessed 17 July 2010. 
7  L Van den Berghe and L DeRidder, International Standardisation of Good Corporate 
Governance (Kluwer 1999); R Aguilera and A Cuervo-Cacurra, ‘Codes of Good Governance 
Worldwide: What is the Trigger?’ (2004) 25 Organization Studies 425-444.
8  Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of compa-
nies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and con-
solidated account of banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings, OJ L 224 16/08/2006.
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promotes their application by requiring that listed companies refer in 
their corporate governance statement to a code, and that they report on 
their application of that code on a comply-or-explain basis.9
Corporate governance is traditionally defined as a system by which 
companies are directed and controlled, and as a set of relationships 
between the company’s management and its stakeholders. 
Notwithstanding supranational and national initiatives in the area of 
corporate governance, one transnational project deserves special attenti-
on: the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance10 of 2004, which are not 
directly targeted at companies themselves, but rather serve primarily as a 
guide for legislative and regulatory initiative in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries.11 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are based on 
a broad interpretation of corporate governance.12 The principles contain 
six key areas of corporate governance: an efficient corporate governance 
framework; the strengthening of shareholder rights; equitable treatment 
of shareholders;13 recognition of the role of stakeholders; disclosure and 
transparency in companies; and the accountability of the board.
Basic rules for the management of companies are contained in the 
laws or other regulations of the state concerned.14 The codes represent 
systematic compilations of principles, standards, good practice and re-
commendations on corporate governance, and their application is not le-
gally binding for companies.15 Corporate governance codes differ also with 
a view to whether they contain provisions applicable at a national level 
(national codes) or at the level of an individual company (company-specific 
corporate governance codes). The application of such codes is voluntary; 
neither an explicit legal basis nor enforcement provisions exist. The lack of 
an explicit legal basis does not deprive the codes of legal consequences. As 
a soft law instrument, the code is binding only for the company, prescri-
9  Commission, Green Paper ‘The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ COM (2011) 16. 
See also Annex 2, ‘List of EU measures in the field of corporate governance’.
10  OECD, ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/do
cument/56/0,3343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_37439,00.html> accessed 17 July 
2010.
11  For more on corporate governance definitions in the codes of the EU Member States, see 
H Horak, K Dumančić and J Pecotić Kaufman, Uvod u europsko pravo društava (Školska 
knjiga 2010).
12  ‘Corporate governance … involves a set of relationships between a company’s manage-
ment, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also pro-
vides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined’, OECD (n 10) 11.
13  Bodiroga-Vukobrat and Horak (n 5) 201.
14  Bodiroga-Vukobrat and Horak (n 5) 201-206.
15  For a full list of national corporate governance codes, principles and recommendations, 
see the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Index of Codes <http://www.ecgi.
org/codes/all_codes.php> accessed 17 July 2010.
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bing certain behaviour in its internal organisation. In most legal systems, 
corporate governance codes at the national level are not mandatory. Their 
enforcement is left to company administrative and management bodies, 
especially the board of directors or management.16 In other cases, there 
is a specific legal basis and enforcement provisions, but such codes are 
mostly applicable to companies listed on a regulated market. Companies 
abide by them voluntarily only because they feel that an elaborate state-
ment on corporate governance is in their best interest and serves the pur-
pose of building confidence in the company’s operations.
Additionally, a corporate governance code can be adopted by an 
association of which a company is a member, and to whose provisions 
it is thus liable to adhere. Another example is where the provisions of a 
certain act explicitly mandate compliance with a code, including legal 
consequences in cases of non-compliance. Consequently, the company’s 
statute would have to contain explicit provisions requiring compliance 
with a national corporate governance code.17
Codes of corporate governance are adopted by various collective expert 
bodies formed by government or non-governmental organisations,18 such 
as government bodies, boards or committees nominated by governments, 
stock exchange bodies, academic, professional and economic associations 
(chambers), employers’ associations (associations of members of manage-
ment bodies) and various groups of investors.19 The application of codes of 
corporate governance is targeted primarily at companies listed on regula-
ted markets, but also at unlisted companies and state-owned companies. 
2. Reasons for the comply-or-explain principle
Corporate governance codes are predominantly based on the comply-
or-explain principle. Under this principle, listed companies must declare 
in their annual accounts whether they comply with the recommenda-
tions from the code or explain why they are not complying. This state-
ment must be permanently available on the company’s website.20 This 
16  The existence of a management or board of directors depends on the choice between 
monist or dualist governance in a company.
17  E Wymeersch, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2005) ECGI Working Pa-
per Series in Law 46/2005.
18  For more on this subject, see E Wymeersch, ‘Implementation of the Corporate Gover-
nance Codes’ in K Hopt, E Wymeersch, H Kanda and H Baum (eds), Corporate Governance 
in Context: Corporations, States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (OUP 2005).
19  See Bodiroga-Vukobrat and Horak (n 5) 201.
20  European Commission, European Corporate Governance Forum, ‘Statement of the 
European Corporate Governance Forum on the Comply-or-Explain Principle’ (2006) and 
‘Annual Report 2005’ (2006) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/
index_en.htm> accessed 26 March 2007.
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approach has proved excellent in practice because it is responsive to 
company-specific needs. Moreover, efficient application of this principle 
favours harmonisation of the legislative and regulatory framework of the 
EU Member States,21 given that the published information provides ma-
terial for conclusions about the practice of companies liable to implement 
the code. This in turn can lead to possible modifications or regulation of 
widely accepted practice. The adoption of common principles becomes 
the foundation for companies’ operations at the supranational level.
As explained above, depending on the law of the Member State, the 
obligation to apply the comply-or-explain principle may be implemen-
ted by law, adopted by a regulatory authority or contained in listing ru-
les. The application of recommendations contained in the code ensures 
a high level of transparency and, notwithstanding mandatory provisi-
ons regulating the mechanisms of liability of members of the company’s 
bodies (in both unitary and dual systems),22 fosters the application of 
the comply-or-explain principle and liability for annual accounts. Thus, 
the comply-or-explain principle depends on an appropriate regulatory 
framework and the existence and correct practical application of share-
holder rights, as well as abandoning the non-transparent acquisition of 
company shares.
The role and activities of regulatory authorities should concentrate 
on monitoring whether the declaration of compliance with the recommen-
dations published in a code exists and taking action in cases of false dec-
larations. One of the outstanding issues with the application of a code is 
the demarcation of legislative solutions from those regulated in the code. 
We are more inclined towards a position that the code should continue 
where the legal act stops.23 It should contain practical instructions on 
how to apply legal solutions and how to act when circumstances require 
taking specific actions to implement the law. 
Given the application of the comply-or-explain principle, we should 
bear in mind the discrepancies resulting from the different legal traditi-
ons of the EU Member States. The different structures of capital markets 
21  This is the conclusion of the European Commission, ‘The Action Plan on Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to 
Move Forward’ COM (2003) 284 final and ‘Final Report on the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for a Company Law in Europe’, 4 Novem-
ber 2002 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf> 
accessed 17 July 2010.
22  See in detail in J Barbić, ‘Pregled odredaba Zakona o trgovačkim društvima o monistič-
kom ustroju organa dioničkog društva’ (2007) 12 Hrvatska pravna revija 44; V Gorenc, Z 
Ćesić, V Buljan and V Brkanić, Komentar Zakona o trgovačkim društvima (RRIF, 2008) 545; 
Horak, Dumančić and Pecotić Kaufman (n 11) 42.
23  See J Barbić, E Čolaković, B Parać and V Vujić, Korporativno upravljanje osnove dobre 
prakse vođenja društava kapitala (Biblioteka Kaleidoskop, Naklada Ljevak 2008) 93.
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and the maturity of the corporate governance tradition in specific states 
should also be taken into account.
3. The comply-or-explain principle in theory
The central element of almost all codes is the comply-or-explain prin-
ciple.24 Its first appearance was in the Cadbury Report: companies listed 
on a regulated market25 had to declare in their annual accounts whether 
24  In Croatian legislation, for the purpose of better monitoring of management and super-
vision in a company, and also the accountability of bodies and directors and the availability 
of information to all interested external stakeholders under Article 65 of the Act on Amen-
dments to the Companies Act of 19 October 2007, Article 272a of the Companies Act was 
deleted and a new Article 272p Statement on compliance with the corporate governance 
code was added under subsection 2B. Unlike, for example, in Great Britain, in Croatian law, 
the comply-or-explain provision is contained in the act itself, and not in the code. The same 
goes for s 161 Aktiengesetz. Given the above, the authors in this paper use the formulation 
in conformity with the Companies Act, which reads as follows: 
‘(1) The supervisory board or board of directors of a company whose shares are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market shall ensure that the management, ie executive directors, of the 
company report in a separate section of the annual report on the company’s position at least: 
a) information on the corporate governance code to which the company is subject and/or 
the corporate governance code which the company may have voluntarily decided to apply 
and/or the corporate governance practices applied beyond the requirements under natio-
nal law as well as information stating where the applicable corporate governance codes or 
corporate governance practices have been published; 
b) whether the company deviates from the corporate governance codes mentioned under a) 
and explanations for areas of deviation;
c) a description of the essential features of internal auditing in the company and risk ma-
nagement in relation to financial reporting; 
d) information on significant direct and indirect shareholders, including indirect share-
holders in pyramid structures and cross shareholdings, holders of securities with special 
control rights and their description, limitations on voting rights such as limitation to a 
certain percentage or number of votes, temporal limitations for realisation of voting rights 
or cases in which, in co-operation with the company, financial rights from securities are de-
tached from their holding, rules on appointment and revocation of members of the board of 
directors, ie executive directors, or supervisory board, and amendments to the statute, and 
powers of members of the board of directors, ie executive directors, or supervisory board, 
especially powers to issue company shares or personally acquire shares;
e) information on the composition and operations of management, ie executive directors 
and supervisory board, or the board of directors and their committees.’
25  The term ‘regulated market’ is defined in Croatian law in Article 3 item 20 of the Capital 
Market Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 88/08, 146/08, 74/09) in accordance 
with Directive 2004/39/EC. Article 3 item 20 states that a regulated market is a ‘multila-
teral system operated and/or managed by a market operator and which fulfils the following 
requirements:
a. brings together or facilitates the bringing together of third-party buying and selling in-
terests in financial instruments in the system, pursuant to predetermined unambiguous 
rules and in a way that results in a contract in respect of the financial instruments admitted 
to trading under its rules and/or systems;
b. possesses authorisation as a regulated market, and
c. regularly functions in accordance with Part two of this Act.’  
The term regulated market is also determined pursuant to the provisions of Articles 308, 
309 ff of the Capital Market Act.
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they complied with the code, and identify and give reasons for any area 
of deviation. In theory, the comply-or-explain principle should provide 
for a flexible code application, ie the application and adjustment of those 
provisions which are important for a specific company and the method 
for achieving conformity. Bearing this principle in mind, non-compliance 
with particular provisions of the code could be justified in certain instan-
ces. Each company must carefully weigh each provision and provide a 
reasonable explanation in the case of non-compliance.26 The informative 
quality of explanations of non-compliance with the code is of extreme 
importance, given the potential liability for any given explanation (sta-
tement). As far as the explain provision is concerned, it is important to 
highlight that non-compliance per se does not imply poor management 
of the company. Some analyses support this statement by showing that 
companies which have explained non-compliance with a code in a reaso-
nable manner have an excellent management.27
The underlying idea behind the comply-or-explain principle is to 
grant flexibility in the application of code provisions, which is precisely 
one of the features of codes as soft law instruments. In this context, we 
believe that the intention of codes is not to have all companies apply and 
adhere to the same provisions. When particular provisions are not suita-
ble for a certain organisational structure, a company is actually expected 
not to align its operations with them, but to explain why those provisions 
are not complied with. Organisational structure and other factors having 
an impact on the company include company size, the structure of shares 
in the company’s equity, the ratio of foreign investment in the company 
and capital market requirements in a given state.28 
The German Corporate Governance Code29 mentions flexibility 
among the essential features of the code, which is implemented to pro-
26  D Seidl and P Sanderson, ‘Applying “Comply or explain”: Conformance with Codes of 
Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany’ (2009) Centre for Business Research, Uni-
versity of Cambridge Working Paper No 389, 5 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP389.
pdf> accessed 17 July 2010.
27  S Arcot and V Bruno, ‘One Size does not Fit All, after All: Evidence from Corpora-
te Governance’, 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=887947> accessed 17 July 2010.
28  T Baums, ‘Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of 
a Very New Nature. Interview with Professor Dr Theodore Baums’ (2001) 2 German Law 
Journal <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43na> accessed 20 July 
2010.
29  The German Corporate Governance Code (the so-called Cromme Code) was adopted by 
the Government Commission for Corporate Governance in 2002. The most recent amend-
ments were in 2010. The Code is available at <http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/
eng/kodex/1.html> and <www.ebundesanzeiger.de> accessed 17 July 2010. Article 161 of 
the Shares Act (Aktiengesetz) prescribes the obligation to give a statement on compliance or 
non-compliance with the recommendations in the Code. On the reform of German company 
law, see T Baums, ‘Company Law Reform in Germany’ (2003) 3 J Corp L Stud 181. 
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tect companies subject to it from limitations arising out of and mandated 
under a legislative framework. Companies should be allowed to adapt 
corporate governance models to their individual circumstances and opti-
mise them in relation to the efficiency of the set criteria. The fundamental 
value of the comply-or-explain principle lies in the fact that companies 
may be entirely aligned with the code, but may also deviate from the code 
in individually adapted areas to the extent and in the manner compliant 
with the comply-or-explain principle.
The comply-or-explain principle does not provide leeway to avoid the 
rules; a company is required to disclose and, in the original British con-
cept of this principle, to provide a public explanation for deviations.30 
Comply-or-explain should actually rest on third parties monitoring and 
implementing compliance with the code. Capital markets and in particu-
lar shareholders and all the stakeholders in a company are third parti-
es.31
It is in the shareholders’ interest to adequately evaluate the signifi-
cance of deviations. In this sense, the very existence of a code is primarily 
to protect shareholder interests.32
The ensuing conclusion is that when an efficient system of regulati-
on exists, investors can act for themselves. It is to be assumed that sha-
reholders will examine the statement on compliance with the corporate 
governance code with all its requisite contents, ie the declaration whether 
the company deviates from the corporate governance code and explanati-
ons for areas of deviation. In addition, a description of the basic features 
of the company’s internal audit as well as risk management in relation 
to financial reporting will be considered. Furthermore, there will be in-
formation on important direct and indirect shareholders in the company 
and the composition and operation of the management and supervisory 
board or board of directors and committees. This will in theory serve as 
the basis for a decision, depending on the level of compliance and sound 
management of the company’s business, on whether to buy, sell, and 
keep stocks, ie when voting on certain decisions at the company’s general 
meeting, etc. 
30  Seidl and Sanderson (n 26) 5.
31  D Kerwer, ‘Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation’ (2005) 18 Governan-
ce 611-632. 
32  Kerwer (n 31).
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Figure 1: The design of the code regime.
Source: see footnote 26, page 7.
In practice, regrettably, many shareholders do not exercise their 
right and obligation to monitor compliance and are therefore referred to 
as ‘absentee landlords’.33 Given the above, the conclusion is that share-
holders have to possess a lot of relevant information to allow them to re-
ach a decision on the corporate governance of the company in which they 
invest. They have sufficient rights at their disposal to accomplish this (eg 
the right to appoint members of supervisory or management boards, vote 
on remuneration policy,34 the right to convene general meetings, etc).
4. Comply-or-explain: experiences from EU Member States 
Comply-or-explain at the supranational level was recommended in 
the EU in 2002 by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts.35 It 
was formally adopted by the European Commission in 2006 in Directive 
2006/46/EC, which introduced the comply-or-explain principle in EU law.
33  RiskMetrics Group, ‘Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Go-
vernance in the Member States (2009) <www.riskmetrics.com> accessed 26 June 2010. 
34  In Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Great Britain, and recently intro-
duced as an option in Germany. 
35  ‘Final Report on the High Level Group of Company Law Experts’ (n 21).
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Under the provisions of the Directive, all companies whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market36 of the EU are required to 
give a statement on the application of a corporate governance code or to 
explain why it is not applied. This statement must be included in a spe-
cific and clearly identifiable section of the annual report or in a separate 
report published together with the annual accounts or by means of a re-
ference in the annual report when such a document is publicly available 
on the company’s website.37
The statement must contain key information on the corporate gover-
nance practice applicable in the company:
a) information on the method of work and competences of the gene-
ral shareholder meeting, and a description of shareholder rights and the 
manner in which they are realised;
b) information on the composition and work of the management and 
supervisory board, or board of directors and their committees; 
c) information on important direct and indirect shareholders, and 
shareholders with special control rights, and a description of those rights, 
limitations on the rights and information regarding their contracts with 
the company;
d) other relations between important shareholders and the company; 
e) information regarding contracts concluded with related third par-
ties; 
f) the existence and nature of the risk management system; 
g) a statement on the application of the national corporate gover-
nance code by the company or an explanation and reasons for deviations 
from the code. 
Although the comply-or-explain principle has already been accepted 
in numerous EU Member States, Directive 2006/46/EC has mandated 
its application and set the minimum requirements, which had not been 
harmonised until this time. 
Company bodies are required to ensure that the annual accounts, 
annual reports and corporate governance statement are drawn up and 
published in accordance with the Directive and international accounting 
standards. A breach of this duty results in the liability of the members of 
management bodies towards the company.
36  For more on the definition of a regulated financial market and trading on it, see Directi-
ve 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets 
in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Di-
rective 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC [2004] OJ L 145/1.
37  Article 1 of Directive 2006/46/EC (n 8) which amends Directive 78/660/EEC by intro-
ducing a new Article 46a.
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4.1. Outstanding implementation issues in the EU Member States 
Bearing the implementation of the Directive in the EU Member Sta-
tes in mind, different approaches to corporate governance codes are ob-
servable. Each Member State has its own tradition and, regardless of 
the provisions of the Directive, each of the codes must be analysed in its 
unique context. The first differentiation between corporate governance 
codes is based on the initiative for their creation and adoption, since 
those who create and adopt it are in principle also authorised to monitor 
its application. Their influence on monitoring instruments for code appli-
cation is very significant.
Corporate governance codes have been adopted in 25 EU Member 
States. For the two remaining Member States, other arrangements are in 
place: in Ireland, the British code of corporate governance applies, whe-
reas in Greece the Corporate Governance Act is in force.38
Figure 2: Sources of initiative for the adoption of corporate gover-
nance codes.
Adapted from RiskMetrics Group (see footnote 33, page 23).
The next difference in approach arises from the manner in which 
corporate governance codes are applied in the EU. In this context, the 
requirement to publish a statement on corporate governance based on 
the comply-or-explain principle prescribed in Directive 2006/46/EC has 
been implemented by law in the practice of EU Member States (Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, the 
38  RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 23.
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Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain).39 This obligation is also fo-
und in securities regulation40 (Portugal, Great Britain), listing rules (Den-
mark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Romania) or the com-
ply-or-explain principle is contained in the code itself (Cyprus, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Sweden). This divergence arises from the fact that the 
choice of method for implementation of the obligation to apply the com-
ply-or-explain principle under Directive 2006/46/EC is left to the Mem-
ber States, provided that it is published and accessible. The deadline for 
transposition of Directive 2006/46/EC was September 2008. By mid-
2010, all Member States apart from Greece had reported the complete or 
partial implementation of Directive 2006/46/EC in national legislation.41 
In conclusion, in the majority of cases where corporate governance 
codes are created by government institutions (public bodies), the obli-
gation to apply the comply-or-explain principle is stipulated in law or a 
by-law. Where a code is created by non-governmental institutions (stock 
exchanges, professional associations and interest groups, etc), the appli-
cation of the comply-or-explain principle does not necessarily arise from 
a law or by-law.
4.1.1. Content and structure of the code 
Corporate governance codes in the EU Member States also differ in 
their content and structure. Some codes contain performance guidelines, 
given the diversity of obligations arising. These codes commonly contain 
three types of guidelines: general principles, which are usually binding 
for the companies (typically copied from the law itself) and recommen-
dations, which are based on general principles. Recommendations are 
applied within the meaning of the comply-or-explain principle. In addi-
tion, such codes may contain suggestions, which usually either indicate 
how to apply recommendations or provide best practice examples. The 
comply-or-explain principle is not applicable to such suggestions (Belgi-
um, Denmark, Germany,42 Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden).43 
Other Member States follow similar, but less elaborated typologies re-
garding the use of terms and gradation between general principles, re-
39  RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 28.
40  Regulations and other by-laws. 
41  European Commission, ‘Transposition of the Accounting Directives as of 19 October 
2010’ <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/transposition/accounting_
dir_transposition_en.pdf> accessed 19 July 2010. 
42  In relation to the application of recommendations, the German Code contains the words 
‘should’ (sollte) and ‘can’ (kann), and companies are allowed to deviate from them, though 
are obliged to publicly declare this each year. The Recitals to the German Code also point 
out that the term ‘shall’ (soll) should be understood as a recommendation. For more on this, 
see Gorenc, Ćesić, Buljan and Brkanić (n 22) 567.
43  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 35.
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commendations and suggestions. Moreover, codes in certain Member 
States (Austria, Ireland, Slovakia and Great Britain) make a distinction in 
application depending on the size of the company or, as in Bulgaria, the 
code stipulates the obligation to apply recommendations only for compa-
nies listed in the highest quotation.44
Notwithstanding the above, the content and structure of the code 
does not automatically determine its quality. Although their content vari-
es from one Member State to another, all codes regulate the same subject 
matter: authorities, composition and the operation of the company’s ma-
naging bodies and their committees, directors’ remuneration, risk ma-
nagement in relation to financial reporting and internal auditing in the 
company, as well as other information important for shareholders.45 The 
quality of the code depends on the legal framework in force in each Mem-
ber State, its practical application, manner of publication, accessibility of 
information, and active shareholder involvement. In addition, the appli-
cation of the code entails efficient monitoring.
4.1.2. Corporate governance models 
The diversities of national corporate governance codes in the EU 
Member States arise not only from the fundamental legal aspects, but 
also from the preferred model of corporate governance. Variations in cor-
porate governance models46 exist in relation to ownership structure in 
joint-stock companies and the method of acquiring capital for the perfor-
mance of economic activities.
When it comes to ownership structure in joint-stock companies in 
the EU Member States, listed companies are quite widespread in Great 
Britain and Ireland, whereas concentration of ownership, ie the existen-
ce of one or more majority shareholders with controlling rights over the 
company is typical in Italy, Austria, Germany and Portugal. Low levels of 
ownership concentration are characteristic of France and the Netherlan-
ds, although not to the extent present in Great Britain. The Nordic states, 
and also Slovenia and Belgium, hold an intermediate position.
In addition, majority shareholders in listed companies can be in-
dividuals, ie families, especially in the Mediterranean countries of the 
EU and Belgium. Majority shareholders in Belgium and Romania are 
non-financial institutions, companies and foundations. A mixture of 
non-financial institutions and families as majority shareholders exists in 
44  RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 35.
45  See, for example, Article 272p (1) of the Companies Act, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Croatia 111/93, 34/99, 52/00, 118/03 (Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Re-
public of Croatia), 107/07, 146/08 and 137/09. 
46  For more on corporate governance models, see Barbić, Čolaković, Parać and Vujić (n 23) 
and Horak, Dumančić and Pecotić Kaufman (n 11) 39-84.
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Germany. Financial institutions as majority shareholders are typical in 
Austria, France and the Netherlands, and particularly in Great Britain. 
In the countries of Eastern Europe, a considerable share in companies is 
frequently owned by the state.47
5. Harmonisation with the requirements laid down in Directive 
2006/46/EC
It is important to remember that the transposition of Directive 
2006/46/EC in the EU Member States ensued through a variety of in-
struments for implementation of the comply-or-explain principle.
•	 Some Member States did not have to take any action, given a 
previously existing requirement to refer to a national code and to 
apply the comply-or-explain principle pursuant to listing rules 
(Denmark, Ireland and Romania).
•	 In certain Member States, the listing rules did not need to lay 
down the application of the comply-or-explain principle, since the 
code itself mandated its application (Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Sweden). 
•	 In other Member States, the combination of governmental and 
non-governmental regulation applies. Usually, the stock exchan-
ge rules refer to national corporate governance codes (and someti-
mes lay down the obligation to disclose compliance with the code, 
without mentioning a particular method), and security market 
rules provide for the application of the comply-or-explain princi-
ple (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Great Britain).
•	 Some Member States have decided to introduce the whole system, 
which includes referral to the application of the code and its appli-
cation pursuant to the comply-or-explain principle prescribed by 
law or a by-law (the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).48
This may create a situation whereby companies must comply with 
different requirements for the application of the comply-or-explain prin-
ciple, particularly where they are not registered or where they are not 
listed in the Member State of their registered seat.49 In the Netherlands, 
47  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 26. See also Federation of European Securities Exchan-
ges, ‘Share Ownership Structures in Europe’ (2008) <http://www.fese.eu/_lib/files/Share_
Ownership_Survey_ 2007_Final.pdf> accessed 20 July 2010.
48  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 24.
49  For more on real seat and incorporation theories, see D Babić andS Petrović, ‘Priznanje 
stranih trgovačkih društava u Europskoj uniji nakon presude Suda Europskih zajednica u 
predmetu Centros’ (2002) 52 Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu 376 and Horak, Duman-
čić and Pecotić Kaufman (n 11).
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for example, the comply-or-explain principle is based on a law regarding 
the Dutch corporate governance code and is mandatory for all Dutch 
companies listed on a regulated market, regardless of where it is. In con-
trast, the requirement to apply the comply-or-explain principle in Great 
Britain, pursuant to the British corporate governance code, is contained 
in the listing rules and applicable to all companies listed in Great Britain, 
regardless of their registered seat. Thus, Dutch companies listed only in 
Great Britain must apply the Dutch code, as the state of its registered 
seat, as well as the British code, as the state of its listing. Bearing this 
in mind, a British company listed in the Netherlands, at least in theory, 
is not obliged to apply either the Dutch or the British code as a result 
of application of the comply-or-explain principle. The survey conducted 
by the Riskmetrics Group reveals a small number of ‘forum shopping’ 
situations, whereby a company elects provisions from various codes to 
fit its needs in order to avoid its obligations rather than achieve greater 
flexibility. In practice, a company with multiple listings, ie in the state of 
its registered seat and in its strategic market, usually chooses the code 
of the state of its registration. As a formal solution to these issues, the 
European Forum for Corporate Governance has proposed the following 
new provisions:50 
•	 if the Member State of the registered seat and the Member State 
of the primary listing are different, the company should choose 
to apply the corporate governance code applicable in either the 
Member State of its registered seat or the Member State of its 
primary share listing; 
•	 a Member State can require that a company that is either re-
gistered in that Member State, or the shares of which are ad-
mitted to trading on a regulated market in that Member State, 
but which applies another Member State’s corporate governance 
code, explain in what significant ways the actual corporate prac-
tices of that company deviate from those set out in the Member 
State’s corporate governance code.
All EU Member States regularly update their corporate governance 
codes either in line with national regulations or with the requirements of 
EU supranational regulations.51 According to surveys conducted in 6 EU 
Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania 
and Great Britain) the procedure for regular updating is formalised. The 
conducted surveys show that updates are more regular than in countries 
50  European Corporate Governance Forum, ‘Statement of the European Corporate Go-
vernance Forum on Cross-border Issues of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2009) <http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-crossborder_en.pdf> acce-
ssed 20 July 2010.
51  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 55. 
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where such formalised procedures are lacking. In other Member States, 
the mechanisms for updates and amendments to codes are informal and 
ad hoc.52 
Directive 2006/46/EC sets minimum joint standards for formal mo-
nitoring of the application of a code and compliance with its provisions.53 
Thus, the Directive prescribes that the board of directors and supervisory 
board, or the supervisory board and auditor are responsible for ensuring 
that the company’s board of directors or its executive directors issue a 
statement on compliance with the corporate governance code.54 
Furthermore, Directive 2006/46/EC requires that the auditors con-
duct formal supervision of the corporate governance statement, regardless 
of whether it was published in an annual report or a separate document.55
Market-wide monitors, as the analysis shows, actively monitor in-
formation by gathering annual reports which contain statements on the 
application of the comply-or-explain principle. In some cases, they also 
analyse the informative value of the corporate governance statement 
and publish the results thereof. Thus, capital market monitors tend to 
be more actively involved than stock exchanges. The survey shows that 
the use of standard forms for corporate governance reporting within the 
EU could raise its quality. However, unprofessional and improperly con-
structed standard forms may lead to a superficial approach to question 
answering (‘box ticking’).56
6. Application in the Republic of Croatia 
Based on the provisions of the Companies Act, Croatian company 
law is presently completely aligned with EU company law, including Di-
rective 2006/46/EC.
For all companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regula-
ted market, Article 272p of the Companies Act prescribes the legal obli-
52  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 77.
53  Article 1(8) of Directive 2006/46/EC, which amends Directive 78/660/EEC and intro-
duces Article 50c.
54  In Croatian company law, Article 272p(1) of the Companies Act prescribes that the 
‘management and supervisory board, or the board of directors … shall ensure that the 
company’s management …’. In this sense, the Companies Act correctly distinguishes 
between the terms ‘ensure’ and ‘submit’, since pursuant to Article 250a of the Companies 
Act, the management has a duty to submit an annual report, which is in conformity with 
the formulation of Article 272p of the Companies Act. For more, see Gorenc, Ćesić, Buljan 
and Brkanić (n 22) 568.
55  Article 1(8) of Directive 2006/46/EC, which amends Directive 78/660/EEC and intro-
duces Article 46a(2).
56  The Croatian Corporate Governance Code on page 24 also includes an annual questi-
onnaire. For more, see <http://www.zse.hr/UserDocsImages/legal/Corporate%20Gover-
nance%20Code-eng2010.pdf> accessed 17 July 2010.
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gation for administrative, management and supervisory boards to make 
sure that the board of directors, ie executive directors, include a corpo-
rate governance statement in a separate section of the annual report. 
The purpose of prescribing the content of the statement is to guarantee 
that all listed joint-stock companies apply the best corporate governance 
practices and that the statement is not just a formality, but a tool which 
will enable all interested persons to gain insight into the actual state of 
governance and business management.
The wording of Article 272p is in conformity with other provisions of 
the Companies Act. Thus, the board of directors has a duty to submit a 
written annual report on the state of the company to the general meeting 
once a year (Article 250a(1)). An integral part of the report of listed joint-
stock companies is the declaration of compliance with the corporate gover-
nance code in Article 272p of the same Act (Article 250a(4)). The declarati-
on in section 1 of this Article must be publicly accessible (Article 250a(5)).57
57  Article 403 of the Capital Market Act is consistent with this provision.
‘(1) The issuer of securities shall make public its annual financial report from section 2 of 
this Article at the latest four months after the end of each financial year and shall ensure 
that it remains publicly available for at least five years from the date of its publication.
(2) The annual financial report of the issuer shall comprise:
1. the audited annual financial statements;
2. the management report;
3. statements made by the persons responsible for drawing up the annual financial report 
of the issuer, whose first name, family name, job and functions within the issuer shall be 
indicated, that, to the best of their knowledge:
- the annual financial statements prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accoun-
ting standards give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit 
or loss of the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole;
- the management report includes a fair review of the development and performance of the 
business and the position of the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation 
taken as a whole, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that 
they face.
(3) The audit report, signed by the persons responsible for auditing the annual financial 
statements, shall be disclosed in full to the public together with the annual financial report 
referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, pursuant to the method and the time period laid 
down in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(4) The provisions of sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Article shall apply accordingly to an issuer 
that is required to prepare consolidated accounts.’
Article 404 of the Capital Market Act:
‘(1) Where an issuer has its registered office in the Republic of Croatia, the reports referred 
to in Article 403 section 2 items (1) and (2) of this Act shall be deemed to be reports drawn 
up pursuant to regulations on the establishment, structure and business activities of sole 
traders and companies and regulations governing the accounting of enterprises and the 
application of financial reporting standards.
(2) If the annual financial statements are not approved by the competent body of the issuer 
within the time period laid down in Article 403 section 1 of this Act, the issuer shall, wit-
hin the time period laid down in Article 403 section 1 of this Act, disclose to the public its 
annual financial statements indicating that the statements have not been approved by its 
competent body.
(3) In the case referred to in section 2 of this Article, the issuer shall, within 7 days of the 
approval of annual financial statements by its competent body, disclose to the public the 
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The provisions of the Companies Act in the Republic of Croatia provi-
de comprehensive legal regulation of the scope of activities of joint-stock 
company bodies.58 Nonetheless, the harmonisation process with EU legi-
slative and regulatory practice has revealed a need to adopt a corporate 
governance code to regulate where the act stops. 
The Corporate Governance Code was first created in 2007 by the 
Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) and Zagreb 
Stock Exchange.59 It was amended to reflect the best corporate gover-
nance practices in the EU Member States. Some authors believe that the 
German code should be used as a model, given the fact that the Croatian 
Companies Act is closest to the German Akt-G. Although this idea is in 
principle correct, Croatian particularities, especially those of the Croati-
an financial market as well as the maturity of the corporate governance 
tradition in the Republic of Croatia should not be overlooked. Of course, 
numerous companies in the Republic of Croatia have their own corporate 
governance codes that can also be included in an annual report within 
the meaning of Article 272p.
A survey60 based on secondary sources from the annual reports of 
265 companies listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange was conducted for 
the purpose of this paper. The purpose of the survey was to determine 
whether the companies have their own code, whether it is being applied, 
and if not, why. The survey shows that out of 265 listed companies,61 167 
of them apply the Corporate Governance Code. 
approved annual financial statements. Where the competent body of the issuer approves 
the annual financial statements in full, as made public in accordance with section 2 of 
this Article, it shall be deemed that the issuer has disclosed its approved annual financial 
statements if it discloses to the public information that the annual financial statements 
previously disclosed to the public have been approved in full by its competent body.
(4) Along with the annual financial report referred to in Article 403 section 2 of this Act and 
the auditor’s report referred to in Article 403 section 3 of this Act, the issuer shall publish in 
full the decision of its competent body on approval of the annual financial statements and 
the decision on the distribution of profit or loss, if the decisions are not an integral part of 
the annual financial report.
58 J Barbić, Pravo društava kapitala vol 2 (Organizator 2005); Gorenc, Ćesić, Buljan and 
Brkanić (n 22).
59 The Corporate Governance Code of the Zagreb Stock Exchange (n 56) was adopted in 
2007. 
60 Information retrieved from the annual reports of listed companies and annual questi-
onnaires on the application of codes of corporate governance, published on the websites 
of the Zagreb Stock Exchange <http://zse.hr/default.aspx?id=26484> accessed 17 July 
2010 and HANFA <http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/hr/publiciranje/izvjesca/> accessed 17 July 
2010. 
61 The Capital Market Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 88/08 and 146/08; 
hereinafter: CMA) lays down the obligations of issuers whose securities are listed on a regu-
lated market managed by the stock exchange, the content of reports and notifications, de-
adlines for the creation and publication, mode of publication and submission to the official 
registry of required information. The mentioned obligations of issuers are prescribed under 
Articles 395-449, 364 and 450-464 CMA.
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Figure 3
Figure 4
The results of the survey lead to the conclusion that out of 167 joint-
stock companies applying a corporate governance code, 163 or 98% apply 
the Stock Exchange Code, while 4 or 2% use company-specific codes.
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Figure 5
The survey also demonstrated that out of 167 joint-stock companies 
applying a corporate governance code, 8 or 6% deviate from it, while 159 
or 95% report full compliance.
The following explanations for deviations from the code are detected: 
- pursuant to legal provisions and the statute, the company has 
assured against abuses of confidential information by persons 
who have access to it; 
- there is no need for compliance with a code;
- there is no legal obligation either in the code or the statute for the 
company to comply;
- the company has not established mechanisms for compliance 
with a code. 
A potential weakness of the application of the comply-or-explain 
principle referred to in Article 272p lies in the fact that the obligation to 
make statements on compliance permanently available (Article 272a) was 
deleted from the current version of the Act. Consequently, the opinion 
is that shareholders should have recourse to the general provisions on 
shareholder rights (Article 250a in particular62). Therefore, without the 
obligation to make the statement on compliance permanently available, 
the wording of Article 250a(5) of the Companies Act actually requires that 
the shareholders actively pursue their right to information (ie by reading 
through the entire annual report, including the declaration of compliance 
with the code).
62  Gorenc, Ćesić, Buljan and Brkanić (n 22) 570.
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As previously stated, the Croatian legislative and regulatory fra-
mework is currently characterised by a high level of alignment with the 
EU legal framework. A significant outstanding issue in business practice 
is, however, the extremely low level of corporate governance culture. This 
gap between legal and business practice has recently resulted in nume-
rous corporate abuses which are presently awaiting resolution in court 
proceedings. Only time will tell whether the outcome of the court procee-
dings will be able to improve the corporate governance culture or raise 
awareness of company governance and management for the benefit of the 
company itself and thus its shareholders as well.
7. Conclusion
The experiences of the EU Member States and developments in legal 
and business practices in the EU show that, although a legislative and 
regulatory framework for the application of the comply-or-explain princi-
ple exists, the true will of company bodies and all external stakeholders 
is needed to apply it in practice. In this sense, the quality of explanati-
ons in cases of deviation has still not reached a satisfactory level. One of 
the outstanding issues is low shareholder involvement in monitoring the 
application of this principle in business practice.
One of the essential factors of efficient implementation of the com-
ply-or-explain principle is the availability and publication of information, 
which is the task of the management, supervisory board or board of di-
rectors. Apart from this, an important role is given to auditors, especially 
when it comes to information availability and publication, in order to 
guarantee reporting quality in corporate governance. Surveys show that 
the comply-or-explain principle could be advanced in business practice 
by granting wider powers to bodies such as regulatory agencies, stock 
exchanges and ad hoc committees. Strengthening the independence of 
regulatory bodies in practice, ie granting wider powers to deal with irre-
gular behaviour, could indisputably further promote this principle.
Following the line of thought presented in this paper, it seems that 
codes as soft law instruments (whether themselves based on the com-
ply-or-explain principle or in the case of a regulatory framework, conta-
ining the same principle based in law) have not proved in practice to be 
attempts at self-regulation but rather an extension of mandatory regu-
lation, arising out of the necessity to regulate this area through a set of 
more detailed and supplementary provisions in the codes. Thus, codes 
supplement regulation where the law stops, and by applying the comply-
or-explain principle enable companies to make information on business 
management and corporate governance publicly available as they see fit 
and in accordance with the legislative framework.
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The comply-or-explain principle is not suitable for application in all 
markets, given the distinctions and variety of legal frameworks, the de-
velopment of capital markets and numerous economic and social factors 
influencing the efficiency of its application. 
In business practice, the application of the comply-or-explain prin-
ciple was obviously not mature enough to prevent the corporate scandals 
of the 1990s and afterwards. The experiences gained from the financial 
crisis of 2008 demonstrate that these problems must be regulated thro-
ugh mandatory provisions when it comes to risk management in relati-
on to financial reporting. Lately, information availability has become the 
crucial requirement for companies. The aim of the obligation to publish 
information, including statements on compliance with a corporate go-
vernance code is to guarantee transparent use of corporate governance 
control mechanisms. Given this, we are of the opinion63 that the comply-
or-explain principle should not be abandoned, but strengthened through 
all available instruments with the purpose of reinforcing the corporate 
governance legal framework.
According to the Green Paper of the European Commission, ‘The 
European Union Corporate Governance Framework’, 
comply-or-explain could work much better if monitoring bodies such 
as securities regulators, stock exchanges and other authorities were 
authorised to check whether the available information (in particular, 
the explanations) is sufficiently informative and comprehensive. The 
authorities should not, however, interfere with the content of the 
information disclosed or make business judgements regarding the 
solution chosen by the company. The authorities could make the 
monitoring results publicly available in order to highlight best prac-
tices and to push companies towards more complete transparency. 
Use of formal sanctions in the most serious cases of non-compliance 
could also be envisaged.64
One way to improve monitoring could be to define the corporate go-
vernance statement as regulated information within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 2(1)(k) of Directive 2004/109/EC, and thus make it subject to the 
powers of the competent national authorities as laid down in Article 24(4) 
of the Directive, which is in line with the analysis and conclusion of the 
authors of this paper.
63  See RiskMetrics Group (n 33) 188.
64  Commission (n 9) 20.
